APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL ABSTENTION
DOCTRINES TO THE DOMESTIC
RELATIONS EXCEPTION TO
FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION
Despite the broad constitutional' and statutory 2 provisions
granting federal diversity jurisdiction, the judiciary 3 has created an

exception to diversity jurisdiction for domestic relations actions. 4 The
federal courts have traditionally refused to entertain any action that

involves divorce, child custody, or alimony, even if the case meets the
statutory requisites for diversity jurisdiction.5 The rationale underlying

this judge-made exception has undergone significant transformation in
6
recent years.

1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;---to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more
States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different
States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) provides, in relevant part, that the federal "district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between. . . citizens of different States."
Originally, the Congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction extended to: (a) a suit of civil nature
at common law or in equity in which there was (b) over $500 in dispute, and which was (c) a suit
between a citizen of the forum state and a citizen of another state. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
3. The Supreme Court has held that the actual extent of diversity jurisdiction is to be
determined by judicial interpretation of the statutory grant. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799).
4. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1186-92 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. There is also an exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction for probate matters. See generally Vestal & Foster, ImpliedLimitationson the Diversity
Jurisdictionof FederalCourts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 1, 13-23 (1956).
5. The rationale underlying the exception has also been extended to domestic relations
actions in which jurisdiction is based upon the presence of a federal question. Seeinfra notes 13665.
6. See, eg., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1978) ("While older cases
indicate that federal courts are entirely without jurisdiction to grant divorces or award custody of
children, more recent decisions hold that strong policies of federal-state comity and deference to
state expertise in the area are the theoretical underpinnings of federal courts' refusal to consider
such cases."). Compare Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Iowa 1951) (The "term
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This note explores the history of the domestic relations exception,
the abandonment of the original statutory rationale, and the
subsequent establishment of a new rationale based on federalism and
judicial economy. The note surveys the decisions applying this new
rationale and argues that, absent a statutory limitation on the exercise
of federal jurisdiction, the domestic relations exception should be
viewed as a form of federal court abstention; that the standards
employed in the abstention doctrines should also be applied to
domestic relations actions; and that the Supreme Court has either
specifically rejected, or never accepted, many of the policy factors
considered by courts applying the domestic relations exception.
The note then reviews the abstention doctrines and applies the
standards and principles found in these doctrines to domestic relations
actions. The note argues that abstention is appropriate in a domestic
relations action only: (1) when the litigants are seeking a divorce, child
custody, or alimony decree and there is an element of unsettled state
law; (2) when there is a concurrent state proceeding involving
peculiarly local factors; or (3) when a state court has already granted a
modifiable divorce, child custody, or alimony decree, and federal court
review would require determination of present or future obligations
under that decree.
I.

TRANSFORMATIONS:

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY THROUGH
THE PRESENT

A. Origins of the Exception.
The domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction
originated in dicta in two Supreme Court decisions in the nineteenth
century, Barber v. Barber7 and In Re Burrus.8 In Barber, the Court
held that a federal district court had jurisdiction in a suit to enforce an
existing separation and alimony decree by a wife living in New York
against her husband, a resident of Wisconsin. The Court prefaced its
opinion, however, by disclaiming federal jurisdiction altogether in orig'domestic relation' is to be given a broad liberal construction") and 1 W. BARRON & A.
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 40.1 (Wright ed. 1960) (The "lower courts
have applied the principle more broadly, however, and will not take jurisdiction of cases which
can be labelled as 'domestic relations' cases even where only property rights are involved"), with
Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that the exception has been "narrowly
confined") and Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Itlhe judge-made
doctrine of abstention sanctions escape from immediate federal decision only in narrowly limited
'special circumstances' ").
7. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
8. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
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inal proceedings involving divorce or alimony. 9
Three members of the Barber Court dissented, arguing that there

could be no diversity jurisdiction because a wife could not have a residence separate from her husband.' 0 The dissent also provided the ra-

tionale for the majority's broad disclaimer, declaring that because
English Chancery did not have jurisdiction over divorce and alimony,

and because federal courts historically derived their equity jurisdiction
from Chancery, Congress did not intend to confer jurisdiction over
these subjects under the Judiciary Act of 1789."

In Burrus,'2 the Supreme Court held that a federal court did not
have jurisdiction to grant an award of an infant's custody under the
federal habeas corpus statutes. The Court declared that the "whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
3

States." 1

9. 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 584. The Court stated:
Our first remark is-and we wish it to be remembered--that this is not a suit asking
the court for the allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The court in Wisconsin was asked to interfere to prevent that decree from
being defeated by fraud.
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in
chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board.
Id
10. Id at 602.
11. Id at 605. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that diversity jurisdiction required "a suit
of a civil nature at common law or in equity." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
This grant of equity jurisdiction has been interpreted to include only that jurisdiction held by the
High Court of Chancery in England at the time that the United States became a nation. In late
eighteenth century England, Parliament held the power to grant a divorce a vinculo matrimonii
(from the bonds of marriage). The ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction to grant a divorce a mensa
et thoro (from bed and board). Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888).
The federal diversity statute was amended in 1938 to provide that diversity jurisdiction extends to "all civil actions." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 85, § 1332, 62 Stat. 930 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). Congress did not intend this amendment to change the scope of
diversity jurisdiction but rather merely to make section 1332 "conform to Rule 2 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." Revisor's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see, e.g., Slapin v. Slapin, 352
F.2d 55, 56 (6th Cir. 1965) (Mathes, J., dissenting) ("The equity jurisdiction of the District Courts,
and of their predecessor circuit courts, as it has existed since conferred by § I 1 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789. . ., has never been held to exceed in scope that which the High Court of Chancery in
England possessed at that time."); see also Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563,
568 (1939); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869); Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 369, 384 (1855).
12. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
13. Id at 593-94. The quoted dictum refers only to the "laws of the United States but...
has been taken as referring to judicial competence as well as legislative." HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 4, at 1017. Butsee Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting).
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The only Supreme Court decision that directly held that federal

courts lack jurisdiction over suits for alimony and divorce is Ohio ex
rel.Popovici v. Agler. 14 The Court in Popovici held that federal courts

did not have jurisdiction to hear a suit against the Vice Consul of
Romania, despite the constitutional 15 and statutory 16 provisions granting the federal courts exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving foreign consuls, 17 because it "has been unquestioned for three
quarters of a century that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce."' 8 The Court held that federal court jurisdiction

did not exist because the subject matter of the suit was not within the
competence of the Chancery Courts in England at the time of the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789.19
The historical arguments 2o that the Chancery courts did not have
jurisdiction in divorce actions and that a wife cannot have a domicile
separate from her husband have been severely criticized 2 and are no

longer viewed as justifications for the exception. The Chancery argument was abandoned because both colonial courts and the English

Chancery had some power to determine marital status and had entertained divorce actions. 22 This argument never adequately explained
the exclusion of child custody cases because these cases were tradition-

ally part of Chancery jurisdiction.23 One court even criticized the presumption that the federal courts' jurisdiction should be limited by the
jurisdiction of England's ecclesiastical courts, noting that some actions
14. 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend. . . to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls."
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976) provides that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of all actions and proceedings against consuls or vice consuls
of foreign states."
17. The Vice-Consul sought a writ of prohibition in the federal court to restrain the divorce
and alimony proceeding in the state court on the ground that the federal courts had exclusive
jurisdiction of the action.
18. Popovici, 280 U.S. at 383.
19. Id at 384.
20. It has never been argued that federal jurisdiction in domestic relations actions is constitutionally limited. Such jurisdiction is apparently constitutionally permissible, because the Supreme
Court has heard appeals from territorial courts involving divorce, see, e.g., De La Rama v. De La
Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899), and has recognized the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in the District of Columbia to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in divorce actions, see Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 581 n.54 (1962).
21. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting the "unconvincing"
nature of the historical account, and the "dubious. . .historical pedigree"); Spindel v. Spindel,
283 F. Supp. 797, 802-03, 806-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
22. See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
23. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 572 (1968).
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that exist today did not exist in the eighteenth century.24 The argument
that diversity cannot exist between spouses is now obsolete because to25
day a wife can have a domicile separate from her husband.
Therefore, there is no statutory limitation on federal jurisdiction in

domestic relations cases; instead courts have developed a new rationale
for the exception based on policy considerations founded on the no-

tions of federalism and comity.26 The most frequently cited policy reasons for the persistence of the domestic relations exception are federal
court deference to state expertise and competence; 27 the problem of

congested federal courts; 8 the lack of congressional or Supreme Court
approval of jurisdiction in the field of domestic relations;2 9 the problem

of continuing supervision and monitoring of a modifiable divorce, alimony or child custody decree;30 the possibility of incompatible state

and federal decrees; 31 and the threat that litigants will play one court
32
system against the other.

As courts began to emphasize policy considerations in determining
whether to assert jurisdiction in domestic relations actions, they altered
the scope of the domestic relations exception and made largely discretionary decisions whether litigants would be entitled to the statutory
right to diversity jurisdiction. In early cases courts held that "the term

33
'domestic relations' is to be given a broad and liberal construction"

and refused to exercise jurisdiction in a case that involved any element
of domestic relations law. More modem courts have held that the ex-

ception should be "narrowly confined."' 34 One court no longer views
24. Lloyd v. Loeffier, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982).
25. See, e.g., Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754, 755 (D. Colo. 1965); Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706, 708 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
26. Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1978).
27. See Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981); Bossom v.
Bossom, 551 F.2d 474, 475 (2d Cir. 1976); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir.
1972).
28. See Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486,
487 (5th Cir. 1978).
29. See Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (Ist Cir. 1981); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018,
1026 (3d Cir. 1975); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d
Cir. 1973).
30. See Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1978); Crouch v. Crouch, 566
F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978).
31. See Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 844 (1st Cir. 1981); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d at 487.
32. See Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 395 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
33. Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Iowa 1951); see also I W. BARRON & A.
HOLTZOFF, supra note 6, at 214.
34. See Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088
(4th Cir. 1980); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir.
1973).
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the domestic relations doctrine as an exception to statutory jurisdiction,
but rather, as a part of the federal doctrine of abstention, which should
35
be applied in "narrowly limited" circumstances.
A confused and inconsistent domestic relations exception doctrine
has emerged because the propriety of federal jurisdiction in each case
must be determined by weighing several policy considerations, which
courts neither weigh equally nor apply consistently. Contemporary
courts acknowledge that the "boundaries of the exception are uncertain," 36 and "the results and reasoning of the cases in this area cannot
be fully harmonized. '37
B.

Conflicting Case Law Applying the Domestic Relations Exception.

There have always been "exceptions" to the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. The Barber Court provided the first
exception, holding that although a federal court did not have jurisdiction to grant a divorce or alimony, it could determine the validity of a
divorce decree.38 The Supreme Court in Simms v. Simms 39 and De La
Rama v. De La Rama 40 also created an exception for appeals from territorial supreme courts. 4 ' In addition, the Court permitted divorce jurisdiction in the federal district courts in the District of Columbia. 42
Since these early Supreme Court cases, lower federal courts have
added other judge-made "exceptions" to the domestic relations exception. For example, federal courts will entertain tort actions with a domestic relations component, 43 but will decline to exercise jurisdiction if
the tort action arises from an "ongoing series of disputes centering
around" the marital relationship.44 Thus, a federal court will hear an
action for false imprisonment, unlawful detention and intentional infliction of mental suffering arising from the parental abduction of a
child, 45 but will decline to exercise jurisdiction when a wife sues her exhusband for false imprisonment of their two infant daughters.4 6
35. See Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972).
36. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982).
37. Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 539 F. Supp. 949, 955 (W.D. Mo. 1982), a9'd, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir.

1983).
38. See Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 592 (1859).
39. 175 U.S. 162, 172 (1899).
40. 201 U.S. 303, 308 (1906).
41. See supra note 20.
42. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 581 n.54 (1962).
43. See Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980); Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174
(7th Cir. 1945); Cohen v. Randall, 137 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 796 (1943).
44. Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Or. 1973).
45. See Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
46. See Kilduff v. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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Contract actions containing domestic relations elements will be
entertained by the federal courts,4 7 but it remains unclear which actions
can be characterized as contractual. For example, although a federal
court will review a pre-divorce separation agreement 4 8 and a "contract" incorporated in a divorce decree,49 the court will decline to exercise jurisdiction in an action attacking the validity of a property
settlement incorporated in a divorce decree. 50
Federal courts also entertain domestic relations actions in cases
involving the constitutionality of a state's action, 5 t a non-frivolous constitutional claim,52 a federal question, 53 and state court decrees ob47. See, e.g., Carr v. Wisecup, 263 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1959) (contracts executed prior to and in

anticipation of separation and divorce).
48. See, e.g., Graning v. Graning, 411 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
49. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 395 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
50. See Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976).
51. The issue most frequently raised is the extent to which one state must enforce the divorce
decrees of another state under the full faith and credit clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Court
in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), specifically disclaimed any intent to use this
clause as a means of circumventing the domestic relations exception doctrine. Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the Court, stated:
The problem is to reconcile the reciprocal respect to be accorded by the members of the
Union to their adjudications with due regard for another most important aspect of our
federalism whereby 'the domestic relations of husband and wife . . . were matters reserved to the States.' . . . The rights that belong to all the States and the obligations
which membership in the Union imposes upon all, are made effective because this Court
is open to consider claims. . . that the courts of one State have not given the full faith
and credit to the judgment of a sister state. . . . But the discharge of this duty does not
make of this Court a court of probate and divorce.
Id at 232-33; see also Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 28 (1903) (suit to determine validity of
divorce obtained in another state); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (suit to determine validity
of legislative divorce); Keating v. Keating, 542 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1976) (action to determine validity of divorce decree under full faith and credit clause); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794,
799 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (action seeking declaration of marital status under the full faith and credit
clause).
52. A federal court will not exercise jurisdiction if it determines that the constitutional issue
is in fact a domestic relations issue in disguise. See Nouse v. Nouse, 450 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D. Md.
1978) (no jurisdiction under civil rights statutes in action alleging interference with communications with children); Delavigne v. Delavigne, 402 F. Supp. 363, 366 (D. Md. 1975), aft'd, 530 F.2d
598 (4th Cir. 1976) (petition for removal on grounds that the defendant could not enforce his civil
rights in state court because the state discriminated in favor of females in domestic actions denied); see also Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("We note-only for
the purpose of illustrating the degree of caution with which we should approach this issue--that a
number of federal courts have declined to involve themselves in disputes over child custody even
when federal constitutional questions were at stake") (citing Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517
(8th Cir. 1980)); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978).
53. See Rocker v. Cellebrezze, 358 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1966) (jurisdiction to determine
whether claimant was entitled to social security benefits as "wife" of insured); Estate of Borax v.
Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666, 672 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966) (jurisdiction to
determine validity of divorce decree for tax purposes); Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 539 F. Supp. 949, 95556 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (jurisdiction to award damages, but not to grant injunctive relief in action
arising out of inclusion of plaintifi's son in federal witness program); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp.
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tained by fraud. 54 Finally, federal courts assert jurisdiction to
determine rightful claimants to an estate when marital status is an es-

sential issue in the case. 55 The confusion surrounding the domestic relations exception is exemplified by comparing Daily v. Parker,56 in
which the court held that diversity jurisdiction extended to an action by
children against a woman for causing their father to leave them, with

Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,57 in which the court held that a federal court
did not have jurisdiction over these actions unless a non-frivolous con58
stitutional claim is also presented.
Although courts are attempting to narrow the domestic relations

exception by looking beneath the pleadings and applying policy con-

siderations before declining to exercise jurisdiction, the new rationale
based on federalism and judicial economy produces conflicting results.

The right of a litigant to diversity jurisdiction often is determined, ultimately, by the location of the district court. By applying the more certain standards for abstention provided by the Supreme Court,
inconsistency of results would be lessened, and the statutory right to
diversity jurisdiction would be more securely protected.

IL

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXCEPTION AND ABSTENTION

Viewing the domestic relations exception as a jurisdictional neces-

sity mandated by statute differs crucially from viewing it as a discretionary doctrine warranted by principles of comity and federalism.5 9
919, 921 (N.D. Cal. 1978), af'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981)
(jurisdiction under ERISA for action against pension plan of employee's spouse for benefits
awarded by state court in divorce action).
54. Vann v. Vann, 294 F. Supp. 193, 194 (D. Tenn. 1968). But see Manary v. Manary, 151 F.
Supp. 446, 448 (D. Cal. 1957). The Manary court stated:
While a federal court in a diversity case may, under certain circumstances, enjoin the
enforcement of a state court judgment obtained by fraud, it has no power to annul, set
aside, or vacate a state court judgment, even if obtained by fraud, where the said court
has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the action, and the state provides
a remedy for the aggrieved party.
id
55. Oxley v. Sweetland, 94 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1938); Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371 (W.D.
La. 1977).
56. 152 F.2d 174, 175 (7th Cir. 1945).
57. 278 F. Supp. 794, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
58. Id
59. In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 3242 (1982),
the dissenting Justice characterized this distinction as that between a "jurisdictional" and a "prudential" bar to jurisdiction.
In Lehman, the Supreme Court held that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction does not extend
to collateral challenges to state court judgments involuntarily terminating parental rights. The
Court held that the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 did not extend to child custody cases because the
children were not in the "custody" of the state, id at 3237, and because the interests of finality and
federalism outweighed any federal interest in individual liberty, if. at 3239. Justice Blackmun
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The policy factors that most federal courts are using to determine
whether to decline jurisdiction suggest that the domestic relations exception doctrine is now analogous to the various federal abstention
doctrines.60 The Supreme Court has never equated the two doctrines;
dissented, saying: "Not one of these reasons is sufficient to erect ajurisdictional,as opposed to a
prudential, bar to federal habeas relief." Id at 3242 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Responding to
the majority's federalism and finality concerns, Justice Blackmun stated: "While I am fully sensitive to these concerns, once again I cannot understand how they deprive federal courts of statutory
jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions." Id at 3243. He concluded that there was no strict
jurisdictional bar and that a "discretionary limit would have allowed the writ to issue only in those
very rare cases that demanded its unique 'capacity to... cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes."' Id at 3245.
The court's argument in denying jurisdiction in Lehman raises the same questions as the
debate regarding whether there is a strict jurisdictional bar in the domestic relations area, or
whether there may be a jurisdictional bar based on deference to state expertise. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Lehman supports the conclusion that there is not a jurisdictional bar, and therefore, the domestic relations exception should be determined by a discretionary limit. The history
of the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy led the majority in Lehman to conclude
that the writ should issue only when the "federal interest in individual liberty is so strong that it
outweighs federalism and finality concerns." Id at 3240.
The question in determining the scope of the domestic relations exception is whether federal
courts should abstain from exercising their original jurisdiction in deference to state expertise.
Federal habeas jurisdiction in child custody cases poses a much greater threat to state judicial
processes than the ordinary domestic relations case because a federal court can overturn a final
state court judgment on habeas corpus review. Id at 3239.
The state's interest in finality, relied on by the Lehman Court, is also not an issue in the
determination of the scope of the domestic relations exception. A decision by a federal court in a
domestic relations action is as determinative of the issue as a decision by a state court. Therefore,
adjudication by federal courts in domestic relations cases is less disruptive than in child custody
cases.

In addition, even if federal habeas jurisdiction is denied in child custody cases, the petitioner
has other federal remedies available. The Court in Lehman denied only collateral review through
federal habeas jurisdiction. The petitioner in Lehman could have instituted an action for direct
review under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), or petitioned for direct appeal or certiorari. See Note, FederalHabeas Corpusin Child Custody Cases, 67
VA. L. REV. 1423, 1440-45 & nn.123-24 (1981). In the domestic relations cases, however, if the
court refuses to exercise diversity jurisdiction, the parties will not have a federal remedy unless a
federal question is also raised.
60. No lower court has explicitly stated that the domestic relations exception is no longer a
question of statutory jurisdiction and is instead a part of the abstention doctrine. Some courts
analyze the issue as an exception to diversity jurisdiction and alternatively as part of the doctrine
of abstention. See Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972); Spindel v. Spindel,
283 F. Supp. 797, 811-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Other courts explicitly state that they are not deciding
whether the issue technically falls within the exception but rather are declining jurisdiction under
the abstention doctrine. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974).
According to the doctrine of abstention, the federal court concedes jurisdiction but declines to
exercise it in the interest of comity and federalism unless the interests of the litigant outweigh the
federalism concerns. For example, in Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982), the federal district court was the only available forum because the
state statute of limitations had run. The appellees contended that this was irrelevant because the
district court never had jurisdiction because the action fell within the domestic relations exception.
Brief for Appellee at 14, Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982). The appellants
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but it is unclear what doctrine other than abstention can support a federal court's decision in a domestic relations case to decline to hear a
case when jurisdiction has otherwise been properly invoked. The argument that Congress intended to limit federal jurisdiction to that exercised by the English Chancery courts has been repudiated. 6' There is
apparently no constitutional mandate for the domestic relations exception, because the Supreme Court has heard appeals in divorce actions
from territorial courts. 62 Courts invoking the domestic relations exception are employing the policy factors that underlie the federal doctrine
of abstention, but are failing to rely on the abstention cases as precedent. Therefore, to avoid inconsistent results, federal courts should adhere to the federal abstention doctrine standards when they determine
whether to decline to exercise jurisdiction in domestic relations actions.
Several of the policy factors 63 that federal courts have used to determine whether to decline jurisdiction in a domestic relations action
should be eliminated from the analysis because they are inappropriate
under the existing abstention doctrines. For example, it is questionable
whether federal court congestion will itself justify abstention.64 The
American Law Institute, in its proposal to codify the abstention doctrine, excluded this argument from its definition of the conditions justifying abstention. 65 There is no explicit Supreme Court decision
concerning this issue,66 and Professor Wright notes that decisions relying on this justification "seem to go beyond anything required by the
demands of federalism that are at the heart of the abstention doctrine." 67 Similarly, the risk that parties will attempt to play one court
system against the other is inherent in diversity jurisdiction and should
not be a factor in the abstention analysis. The argument that courts
responded that the federal court did have jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of citizenship but

could decline to exercise that jurisdiction by reason of abstention. Appellants argued that because
the abstention doctrine is based on the premise that the federal courts will decline jurisdiction so

that a state court can decide the case, the district court should not have declined jurisdiction
because there was no longer an available state forum. Brief for Appellant at 5, Wasserman v.
Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982).

61. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 20.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
64. See generally Ashman, Alfini, & Shapiro, FederalAbstention: New Perspectives on Its
Current Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629 (1975).
65. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 49 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY].
66. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(congestion of federal courts is an appropriate justification for abstention), with Thermtron Prods.,

Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976) (a suit may not "be dismissed or referred to state
courts" because a federal court "considers itself too busy to try it").
67. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 228 (3d ed. 1976).
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must wait for Congress to confer jurisdiction is also flawed; Congress
has already done so in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.68 The question is not whether
jurisdiction exists, but instead, whether it should be exercised. Finally,
the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the possibility of incompat69
ible state and federal decrees as a justification for abstention.
The remaining domestic relations doctrine policy considerations of
federal court deference to state expertise and competence and the problem of continuing supervision and monitoring of a modifiable divorce,
alimony or custody decree, are factors related to the interests of federalism and comity that underlie the abstention doctrine. These interests,
however, are not necessarily furthered by abstention in each case that
contains a domestic relations component. Although no clear standards
emerge from the various abstention doctrines,

70

a federal court should

refuse to assume jurisdiction in a specific domestic relations case only if
that refusal furthers those policy interests underlying the abstention
doctrines.
III.

THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION AND THE
ABSTENTION DOCTRINES

A. The Abstention Doctrines.
There are approximately four 71 distinct abstention doctrines. According to Pullman72 abstention, a federal court should abstain from
deciding a case involving a sensitive constitutional issue when state
court determination of an unsettled question of state law might make it
74
unnecessary to confront the constitutional question.73 Under Burford
abstention, federal courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction when
federal adjudication would be "disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." 75 Under Younger 76 abstention, or more properly, the doctrine of
"equitable restraint," a federal court will decline to enjoin either a state
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
69. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976)
("the mere potential for conflicts in the results of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant
staying exercise of federal jurisdiction").
70. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1978).
71. Neither the Supreme Court nor commentators have been able to agree how many abstention doctrines exist today. The four categories discussed here are based on the Court's analysis in
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976).

72. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

73. See id at 500.
74. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).

75. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
76. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit
except where necessary to prevent immediate irreparable injury, 77 or a
78
state civil proceeding in which important state interests are involved.
Finally, under Colorado River 79 abstention, a federal court may dismiss
an action "due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for rea'80
sons of wise judicial administration.
This note addresses only the Butford and Younger doctrines. Few
domestic relations exception cases present the Pullman abstention paradigm of both unsettled state law and a sensitive constitutional issue.
Furthermore, Colorado River abstention does not apply because concurrent jurisdiction over domestic relations actions does not involve the
"exceptional circumstances" 8 ' upon which such abstention is based.
B. Diversity Jurisdictionand the Abstention Doctrine.
The Supreme Court could resolve the uncertainty surrounding
federal domestic relations jurisdiction by announcing that the domestic
77. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971).
78. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
79. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
80. Id at 818.
81. Id In Colorado River, the Court found that even if traditional abstention requirements
are not met, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction in deference to a concurrent state proceeding "'for reasons of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'" Id at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. CO-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). The Colorado River Court was not addressing
the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction but was concerned with avoiding duplicative litigation
when there was already a concurrent state proceeding. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). The Court limited its holding by noting that "the mere
potential for conflicts in the results of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction." Id at 816. It also held that only "exceptional" circumstances and the
"clearest ofjustifications will warrant dismissal" due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding. Id at 818-19. The Court found precedent for such abstention in cases holding that the court
first assuming jurisdiction over the res in the action had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, in
cases dismissing actions under theforum non conveniens doctrine, and in cases allowing dismissal
of a claim to avoid piecemeal litigation. See id at 818. It found such circumstances present in the
Colorado River factual situation. The Court noted several factors in the case which together constituted "exceptional circumstances." Id at 819. These included: the congressional policy behind
the federal statute invoked in the case favoring avoidance of piecemeal litigation of water rights;
the absence of any proceedings other than the filing of the complaint in the district court; the great
distance between the federal and state courts; the "extensive involvement of state water rights";
and the participation of the federal government in water rights actions in other courts in the state.
Id at 819-20. It is important to note that the Court emphasized the "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them." Id at 817. This statement
implies that the often articulated policy justification for the domestic relations exception-the
possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees-is not in itself sufficient to justify abstention. Furthermore, under the "exceptional circumstances" test set forth in ColoradoRiver, the
mere fact of a concurrent state domestic relations proceeding will not justify abstention.

Vol. 1983:1095]

DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION

1107

relations exception is but another abstention doctrine.82 But such a
pronouncement would conflict with the Court's previous decisions concerning abstention in diversity cases.83 The presence of diversity jurisdiction in an action in which the Court chooses to abstain has caused
considerable conflict among the Supreme Court Justices.8 4 In diversity
cases the Supreme Court has developed special safeguards that would
apply equally well to abstention in domestic relations cases.8 5
1. BurfordAbstention. The Court has recognized that abstention
may be appropriate in diversity cases.8 6 The Court first addressed the
issue in Meredith v. City of Winter Haven 87 In Meredith the Court held
82. The American Law Institute adopted this approach in its Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts. This study proposed that Congress enact a new code
section, excluding domestic relations actions from the jurisdiction of federal courts, unless otherwise provided by a separate act of Congress. ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 36 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968). This proposal was not
included in Part I of the Institute's Official Draft. See ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Official Draft, Part I, 1965).
83. See infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
84. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31-44 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336-48 (1943)(Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
85. The practice ofjudicial abstention in cases in which jurisdiction is based solely on diversity is itself something of an anomaly. Nothing in the federal diversity statute allows federal
courts any measure for discretion. Early Supreme Court cases indicate that if federal jurisdiction
existed, a litigant had an absolute right to be heard in a federal forum. See, e.g., Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no [more] right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."). Yet the entire notion of
abstention contradicts the idea of an absolute right to a federal forum.
When a litigant invokes federal jurisdiction in a diversity case, he is usually seeking protection from the possibility of local prejudice. Yet when a federal court abstains the litigant is relegated to a state court; thus abstention causes the very result that the diversity statute was designed
to avoid. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 1051-58; Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction:

Scapegoat of Overcrowded FederalCourts, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 197, 201-05 (1982). Fear of
local prejudice as a basis for federal jurisdiction has been criticized, but "no one has yet established, by survey or other empirical proof, that parochial bias has so dissipated that diversity
jurisdiction has become obsolete." Id at 203 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the possibility of local
prejudice is greater in domestic relations actions because of the peculiar state interest involved.
See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
In view of the current debate over the very existence of federal diversity jurisdiction it is
important to state at this point that this note does not assert that federal courts ought to grant
divorce, child custody, and alimony decrees. It merely concludes that under current law these
domestic relations actions can be precluded from federal jurisdiction only by proper application of
the recognized abstention doctrines. Until Congress amends the diversity statute, a litigant has a
statutory right to be heard in a federal forum when the diversity requirements are met; application
of the recognized abstention doctrines to the domestic relations exception is necessary to protect
this right from unprincipled limitation.
86. See generally Gowen & Izar, FederalCourt Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43 TEx. L. Rav. 194 (1964).
87. 320 U.S. 228 (1943). The petitioners in Meredith, municipal bondholders, sued in a federal district court seeking a declaration that the defendant city should not call and retire the bonds
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that difficulty in ascertaining state law does not itself justify abstention
in a diversity case. 88 The Supreme Court has, however, upheld abstention in a diversity action in Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 39 and several subsequent decisions, even in the absence of unsettled state law.
Jurisdiction in Burford was based on both diversity and the existence of a federal question. 90 In Burford, the Court upheld abstention

in a suit brought to enjoin the execution of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission. The Court emphasized the complexity of the issue:

the comprehensive regulatory system for conservation of oil and gas in
Texas, and the fact that the Texas legislature had provided for direct,
de novo review of the Commission's orders in the state courts of only

one county in the state. 91 The Court concluded that the issue so
"clearly involves basic problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to
' '92
consider them.
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co. 93 involved a specialized statutory scheme for judicial review, which

presented no issue of unsettled state law. Jurisdiction was predicated
on both diversity and existence of a federal question. The Court found
Burford abstention appropriate because the controversy involved

predominantly local issues 94 and because the statute assigned all appeals of Commission decisions to a single court. 95 In Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States, 96 the Supreme Court
characterized Burford and Southern Railway as requiring abstention
and an injunction restraining the city from calling the bonds. Jurisdiction rested solely on diversity of citizenship. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, basing the decision on its finding of unsettled state law.
88. Id at 234. The Court continued:
The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the federal courts or to
serve their convenience. . . . In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional circumstances warrant its non-exercise, it has from the first been deemed to be the
duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of
state law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment.
Id
89. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
90. The federal question presented in Buford was not, however, an additional ground for
abstention. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21
(1976).
91. 319 U.S. at 325.
92. Id at 332. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the importance of diversity jurisdiction as "a duty enjoined by Congress and made manifest by the whole history of
the jurisdiction of the United States courts." Id at 336 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
93. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
94. Id at 349-50.
95. Id at 348.
96. Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800.
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when federal review "would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." 97 Thus, Burford abstention is appropriate when the state has a
unified procedure for review of administrative orders and when federal
intervention would disrupt the state's efforts to establish a coherent policy on a matter of substantial public concern.
In Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 the Supreme Court implied that the mere
existence of a domestic relations component will not satisfy the "substantial public concern" requirement. In Zablocki the Court found
Burford inapplicable in an action challenging the constitutionality of a
Wisconsin statute forbidding any person under a court-ordered obligation to support a minor child to marry without first obtaining an order
indicating court approval. 99 To get court approval under the statute

the applicant had to show that the support obligation had been met and
that the child was not likely to become a public charge. The Zablocki
Court found Burford inapplicable because the case did not involve
complex issues of state law, and because resolution would not be "'disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a
matter of substantial public concern.' ""0°

Apparently, the existence of a complex administrative scheme in
addition to a substantial state interest is a prerequisite to Burford abstention in the absence of an element of unsettled state law. This proposition is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux 101 and County of Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co. ,102 which followed Burford, and which require a
substantial state interest and an element of unsettled state law before a
03
court can abstain in a diversity action.'
The Court upheld abstention in a diversity action in Thibodaux,
over a vigorous dissent, 104 and in apparent contradiction to its decision
97. Id at 814.
98. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
99. Id at 379-80.
100. Id at 379 n.5 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-15); see also Wynn v. Carey, 582
F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978) (Burordabstention inapplicable in action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against alleged unconstitutional provisions of the Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act).
101. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
102. 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
103. This proposition is also supported by the Court's application of Burford abstention in
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (per curiam). Kaiser did not involve a
state regulatory or administrative scheme but presented an issue of water rights, of vital concern in
the arid state of New Mexico, and according to the Court, "a truly novel one." Id at 594.
104. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Thibodaux, argued that there was no more possibility of
conflict with the state in an eminent domain proceeding than there would be in an ordinary negligence or contract action, 360 U.S. at 35 (Brennan, J., dissenting), that abstention was appropriate
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the same day in Mashuda. Both cases involved the question of the

state's eminent domain power. Relying on the "special and peculiar
nature" of eminent domain proceedings as "intimately involved with
sovereign prerogative,"' 0 5 and on the fact that the issues are deter-

mined by local variation in legislation, the Thibodaux Court held that
abstention was justified.'0 6 But the implication that the Thibodaux
Court's decision was based on the peculiar nature of eminent domain
proceedings was undercut when Mashuda held that a district court had

improperly abstained in another case involving eminent domain proceedings. In Mashuda the Court held that abstention was inappropriate because the exercise of jurisdiction
would not entail the possibility of a premature and perhaps unnecessary decision of a serious federal constitutional question, would not
create the hazard of unsettling some delicate balance in the area of
federal-state relationships, and would not even require the court 0to7
guess at the resolution of uncertain and difficult issues of state law.1
The Mashuda Court characterized the doctrine of abstention as

"an extraordinary and narrow exception" that can be justified "only in
the exceptional circumstances where the order.

an important countervailing interest."' 08

. .

would clearly serve

The Court explained its

holding in Thibodaux by stating that "the fact that a case concerns a

State's power of eminent domain no more justifies abstention than the
fact that it involves any other issue related to sovereignty."'' 0 9 Implicit
in only a "narrow area" of cases, and that "jurisdiction must be exercised in all other situations"
because it "would obviously wreak havoc with federal jurisdiction if the exercise of that jurisdiction was a matter for the adhoc discretion of the District Court in each particular case." Id at 36.
105. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28.
106. Id at 29. The Thibodaux Court distinguished Meredith on the ground that the issue in
Meredith was whether 'Jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court," whereas Thibodaux
involved staying the disposition of a retained case. Id at 27 n.2. This might be an important
consideration in the inquiry of whether abstention is appropriate in diversity cases. A litigant's
right to a federal forum is not abrogated when a court in a diversity case merely stays disposition
pending state court determination of unsettled state law. The right, however, is impermissibly
abrogated if a court orders dismissal. This distinction has not been viewed by the Court as controlling because under the Burford abstention doctrine, which is applied in diversity cases, the
court is required to dismiss the action.
107. 360 U.S. at 186-87.
108. Id at 188-89.
109. Id at 191-92. The Court, in determining that the state's interest in eminent domain proceedings was not sufficient to justify abstention, cited other interests that would also not be
sufficient:
Surely eminent domain is no more mystically involved with "sovereign prerogative"
than a State's power to regulate fishing in its waters, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, its
power to regulate intrastate trucking rates, Public Utilities Comm'n of California v.
United States, 355 U.S. 534, a city's power to issue certain bonds without a referendum,
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, its power to license motor vehicles, Chicago v.
Atchison, T & S.F.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, and a host of other governmental activities.
Id at 192.
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in the reasoning in these two cases is the recognition that the right to
diversity jurisdiction outweighs the state's interest in eminent domain
proceedings, a state interest that would seem to be as great as that in
domestic relations cases. Lower federal courts have interpreted the distinction between Mashuda and Thibodaux as providing a standard for
abstention in diversity cases that lack an unsettled state law issue: both
unclear state law and a broad impact on state policy must be present in
the case." 10
Therefore, the Burford line of cases stands for the proposition that
a federal court may not abstain in a diversity action unless there is a
state interest of substantial concern and either an issue of unsettled
state law, or a complex administrative scheme with which federal review would interfere.
2. Application of Burford Abstention Principlesto Domestic RelationsActions. Whether based on tradition"' or precedent, a state's interest in domestic relations is of substantial concern, and therefore is
sufficient to meet the first requirement for Burford abstention in diversity cases. Under the Burford abstention doctrine, if there is also an
issue of unsettled state law in a domestic relations action, then abstention is justified." 2 The question remains whether, absent unsettled
state law, the state's administration of domestic relations will satisfy the
"complex administrative scheme" requirement found in Burford. Although some states do have specialized courts that adjudicate only domestic relations actions, 1 3 family and juvenile court systems cannot be
equated with the complex administrative schemes found in Burford
and Southern Railway; nevertheless, the reasoning in these two cases is
probably applicable to the analogous comprehensive state administrative and judicial mechanisms employed in domestic relations actions.
Burford abstention, however, must be limited to those cases in which a
federal court is asked to grant a divorce, child custody, or alimony de110. See, e.g., Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.
1980); Miller Davis Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1977). The
court in Miller Davis stated:
It seems that before a federal court abstains in a diversity case, and forces a plaintiff to
sacrifice completely his right to a federal forum, it should be convinced that the state
issues which are unclear are considerably complex and that their incorrect resolution will
threaten an important state policy.

id at 326.
111. The tradition arose from the idea that states had to assert broad power over marital status
as part of their duty under the police power to protect the public welfare. See H. CLARK, supra
note 23, at 35.
112. This analysis was applied in Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490
F.2d 509, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1973).
113. See, e.g., CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 1740 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 411,
511, 652 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1982).
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cree; modify, and thus continuously supervise, a divorce, child custody,
or alimony decree; or grant relief that would in effect determine present
or future fights under one of these decrees. Only in these cases is something resembling a complex state administrative scheme involved.
Abstention is appropriate only when the action requires determination of peculiarly local factors and the assistance of local agencies.
For example, in a custody determination courts generally consider such
local factors as the standard of living and the financial needs and resources of each party.'1 4 This is also true in alimony determinations
and actions to modify a decree, which usually involve the question of
the feasibility of employment. 15 Further, in custody determinations a
court will often require a report from a local social services counselor, 1 6 and many courts in divorce actions require legally supervised
counseling. 117 Bu ford abstention is appropriate in these actions both
because a federal court determination of these issues would enmesh the
federal court in the operation of the local agencies and thereby disrupt
the local administrative scheme, and because the federal system lacks
facilities for counseling and other social services. Abstention may be
inappropriate, however, in cases where state courts have issued a final
decree, because local factors and agencies will no longer be involved.
Analysis of three recent federal appellate decisions demonstrates
how Burford abstention could be applied in domestic relations actions.
The cases considered whether the tort of parental kidnapping, or
"childnapping," falls within the domestic relations exception. All three
cases held that it does not, but two of the courts held that the domestic
relations exception precluded certain types of relief. This conclusion is
consistent with the application of Burford abstention to the domestic
relations exception.
In Wasserman v. Wasserman," 8 the plaintiff brought a diversity
action alleging child enticement and intentional inffiction of emotional
distress. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the case. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the torts did not fall
within the domestic relations exception because they were not depen114.
(1982).
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4065, 4087
See id at 4084.
Seeid at4066.
See, e.g., TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 3.54 (Vernon 1975).
671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982).
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dent on a family relationship," t9 sought no adjustment of family status,
and did not require application of any rule "particularly marital in
20
nature." 1
The issue of injunctive relief to remedy childnapping was addressed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Bennett v. Bennett.' 2' In Bennett, the plaintiff brought an action
against his former wife seeking monetary relief and an injunction
prohibiting her from interfering with his child custody rights. 122 The
court held that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit
and to award damages, but could not grant injunctive relief because it
would require an inquiry into the present interests 123 of the minor children, an inquiry that is "within the peculiar province, experience, and
competence of the state courts." 24 This analysis is consistent with the
policy in Burford that federal courts should avoid adjudication of issues when the state has developed a particular administrative scheme
for determination of those issues.
The Bennett court, however, was faced with another issue counseling against abstention, the inadequacy of the state forum. Only a federal court could provide relief if the Ohio state court refused to enforce
the District of Columbia custody decree. The court responded that federal jurisdiction was not the best solution to this dilemma, preferring
instead the solutions presented by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,12 5 or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.126 The
court noted that "conspicuously absent from'this comprehensive enactment is any provision creating or recognizing a direct role for the fed119. Wasserman, 671 F.2d at 834-35.
120. Id at 835.
121. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
122. Id at 1039.
123. The "present interests" of the child are those factors which a court must weigh in deciding the custody of the child. See H. CLARK, supra note 23, §§ 17.4-17.6 (1968).
124. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1043. Judge Edwards concurred in the holding that federal diversity
jurisdiction extended to granting damages for the tort of "childnapping," id at 1044 (Edwards, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part), but dissented from the part of the opinion excluding
injunctive relief from federal jurisdiction, because "[e]nforcement of a valid and final state decree
does not require a federal court to inquire into the present best interests of minor children; rather,
the federal court need only give effect to the binding decision of a state court." Id at 1045.
125. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979).
126. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, 42
U.S.C. § 663, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (Supp. V 1981)) [hereinafter cited as PKPA].
The PKPA was enacted in part in response to the reluctance of the Supreme Court to extend
application of the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, to child custody decrees.
See Comment, ParentalKidnapping- Can the Un/form Child CustodyJurisdictionAct and Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 Effectively Deter It?, 20 DUQ. L. REv. 43, 47-49 (1981). In
response to this problem the PKPA requires that every state recognize and enforce without modification the child custody decrees of sister states. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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eral courts in determining child custody. Indeed the legislative history
of the Act makes clear that Congress deliberately and emphatically
omitted such a role."127 Therefore, the court in Bennett did not err in
abstaining because the litigants could obtain adequate relief in other
28

courts.1

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used a
similar analysis in Lloyd v. Loeffler 129 with regard to the question of an
escalating punitive damage award in a child kidnapping case. The trial
court judgment in Lloyd provided that the punitive damage award
would increase two thousand dollars for each month that the child was
not returned to his father's custody.
The appellate court in Lloyd found that the tort was not within the
domestic relations exception because the suit did not contest the validity of the custody decree, the suit did not "seek one of the distinctive
remedies provided by family courts,"' 30 the issues were not those that
only state courts are competent to resolve,' 3' and the issues required
"no special experience with the business of domestic relations." 32 The
court believed, however, that the variable award of punitive damages
was "the practical equivalent of an injunction" ordering the abductors
to return the child to her father, and thus was an implicit decision of
who should have custody of the child. 33 Had the issue been raised,
there would have been a "substantial question" whether the award was
within the court's subject matter jurisdiction.134 Again, the reasoning is
consistent with the reasoning in the Burford line of cases because the
135
custody decision involves peculiarly local concerns.
127. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1043.
128. If no state forum or other relief is available, the court should not abstain. See Ruffalo v.
Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 718 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding the domestic relations exception inapplicable
because state court could not grant "effective" relief to the plaintiff).
129. 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
130. Id at 492.
131. Id at 493.
132. Id

133. Id at 494.
134. Id The Lloyd court could only note its disagreement because the only people who could
complain were fugitives and not before the court. The court discussed the issue to avoid creating

the false impression that the issuance of such a decree raises no jurisdictional problems. Id at
493-94.
135. The Lloyd court also presented the concept of "ancillarity" as an alternative rationale for
much of the domestic relations exception. The court reasoned:
When a case must begin in state court, as a divorce or custody case must, retention of
any ancillary litigation in the same court is supported by considerations ofjudicial economy. . .[and] relative expertness since the issues in an ancillary proceeding may be the
same as those in cases that are within the core of the domestic relations exception. . ..

[It also] avoids "piecemeal, duplicative, or inexpert handling of what is substantially a
single controversy.
Id at 492-93.
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C. Younger and the Domestic Relations Exception.
In a development that is closely analogous to the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, several federal courts
have held that the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint requires
136
deferral to pending or ongoing state domestic relations proceedings.
This practice, which has an impact upon litigation of domestic relations
actions in federal courts parallel to that of the domestic relations "exception," suffers from many of the same infirmities.
The Younger doctrine of equitable restraint is not directly applicable to the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction.
Younger applies only when jurisdiction is based upon a federal question, and then only when a federal court is asked to enjoin a pending
state proceeding. Neither of these Younger requirements is present in a
"domestic relations exception" case, and therefore the policies embodied in Younger cannot lend support to the domestic relations exception.
Younger, as applied to domestic relations actions, is analogous to the
domestic relations exception, however, because both are premised on
the strong state interest in domestic relations law.' 37 Therefore the
same problem arises in the equitable restraint cases as in the exception
cases: when does federal court review of an action with a domestic
relations component interfere with the state's peculiar interest in domestic relations law?
The bare holding in Younger was that absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal court may not enjoin a pending criminal trial in a
state court. Younger was premised on the interests of equity, comity,
and federalism, policies that are directly applicable to the state's interest in domestic relations actions. The Court's subsequent application
of the Younger doctrine to certain types of civil actions could have serious implications for domestic relations actions, because such actions
frequently involve ongoing state proceedings due to the modifiable nature of divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. But neither the
policies of equity, comity, and federalism, nor these subsequent decisions concerning Younger equitable restraint warrant the conclusion
that federal courts must abstain in every domestic relations action in
This alternative rationale must also be rejected. The risk of inconsistent federal and state
decrees, and avoidance of piecemeal, duplicative litigation is insufficient to justify abstention except in "exceptional" circumstances. Colorado Riper, 424 U.S. at 816-17.
136. See, e.g., Littleton v. Fisher, 530 F.2d 691, 693 (6th Cir. 1976) (child custody proceedings); Kahn v. Shainswit, 414 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (divorce proceedings).
137. See Kahn v. Shainswit, 414 F. Supp. 1064, 1067-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Younger abstention
warranted when divorce proceeding pending because domestic relations matters predominantly of
state concern).
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which a federal question is raised; instead this note argues that Younger
principles demand restraint only in those actions in which federal review would interfere with a pending state court proceeding concerning
a divorce, child custody, or alimony decree, or when a state decree is
modifiable and federal review would effectively modify the decree, as
opposed to determining its validity.
In Younger, the Court defined "comity" as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are 38left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways.'
Principles of federalism, the Court found, command "a system in
which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Government" so that when the federal government acts, it
does so "in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the states."1 39 Determining whether federal review of a state
court domestic relations decree impermissibly intrudes on legitimate
state activity requires examination of those civil actions in which the
Court has held Younger applicable.
Although the Supreme Court has specifically declined to extend
Younger to all civil actions, 140 in Huffman v. Pursue,Ltd 141 the Court
applied Younger and refused to interfere with enforcement of a state
civil nuisance statute. Although the Huffman Court emphasized the
quasi-criminal nature of the statute, 42 later Supreme Court decisions
have made it clear that Younger principles are not limited solely to
such state civil proceedings "in aid of and closely related to criminal
statutes." '43
In Juidice v. Vail'" the Court held that Younger barred declaratory and injunctive relief in state civil contempt procedures. The
Juidice Court relied particularly on the fact that the state's entire con45
tempt process was at issue.'
138. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44.
139. Id
140. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 n.8 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 445 n.8
(1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.13 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607

(1975).
141. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
142. Id at 604-05.
143. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
144. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
145. The Juidice Court reasoned:
A State's interest in the contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system, so long as that system itself affords the opportunity to pursue
federal claims within it, is surely an important interest. . . . [W]e think the salient fact
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The Court also found the state concern important enough to justify abstention in Trainor v. Hernandez.146 In Trainor a state agency
obtained a writ of attachment in a civil action to recoup welfare payments which allegedly had been obtained fraudulently. The defendant
then sought an injunction against the attachment. The Court held
Younger applicable because "[b]oth the suit and the accompanying
writ of attachment were brought to vindicate important state policies
47
such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of those programs."'
The crucial factors in the application of Younger equitable restraint to civil proceedings appear to be whether the state is a party in
the action and the importance of the state's interest.'48 The Supreme
Court addressed the sufficiency of the state's interest in domestic relations in Moore v. Sims. 149 In Moore a bare majority of the Court held
that the Younger doctrine barred federal determination because of a
pending proceeding brought by the state for temporary custody of children who allegedly had been abused. The Court disclaimed any intention to announce that Younger principles were applicable to all state
civil proceedings 50 and emphasized the compelling state interest in
quickly removing child abuse victims from their parents. 15' Moore,
therefore, does not stand for the proposition that Younger equitable
restraint is appropriate in every proceeding in which there is a pending
state domestic relations action.
Lower courts have split on whether Younger applies to most civil
actions.' 52 Some federal courts have found Younger principles applicable to domestic relations actions and have deferred to pending state
actions.' 53 These cases hold that even if a petitioner is not asking the
is that federal-court interference with the State's contempt process is "an offense to the
State's interest . . . likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal
proceeding."
430 U.S. 335-36 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604).
146. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).

147. Id at 444.
148. See Trainor, 431 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The substantiality of the State's
interest in its proceeding has been an important factor in abstention cases under Younger v. Harris
• . .from the beginning.").
149. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
150. Id at 423 n.8.
151. Id at 435.
152. Compare Lamb Enters. v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d 1052, 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968
(1978) ("The same principles of federalism, equity and comity which underlie federal court reluc-

tance to interfere in state criminal proceedings apply with substantial force when the federal court
is asked to enjoin state civil proceedings."), with O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1982)
("In those cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the Younger doctrine to civil litigation,
the state was a party and, more importantly, was seeking to vindicate important state policies.").
153. See, e.g., Littleton v. Fisher, 530 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (refused to grant
injunction in civil rights action with respect to proceeding in state domestic relations case regard-
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federal court to enjoin state domestic relations proceedings, the court
should abstain if the effect of federal review would be to bring the state
proceedings to a halt' 54 or to nullify a state domestic relations decree.' 55 The requirement that federal courts abstain when review
would halt state proceedings parallels Younger's command that state
proceedings not be enjoined. But federal court abstention because federal review would effectively nullify a state court domestic relations decree goes far beyond the policies underlying Younger equitable
restraint.
In domestic relations actions litigants are essentially asking the
federal court to determine the validity of a decree. For example, in
Williams v. Williams, 156 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found Younger principles applicable in an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against adoption proceedings that
were used to sever appellant's legal relationship with his children. The
court found that Younger principles barred declaratory and injunctive
relief because such relief would nullify the state court adoption decree,
which "relates to an area, domestic relations, which has traditionally
been the province of the states."' 57 But the Williams court failed to
examine the reasons why domestic relations actions are within the
province of the state and appears to imply that in any action involving
domestic relations Younger equitable restraint is appropriate. The
court was not asked to grant or modify a custody decree,15 8 but to determine whether lack of notice in state proceedings severing parental
rights violates the Constitution, and if so, to enjoin enforcement of a
decree granted in constitutionally infirm proceedings. This question is
not within the peculiar province of the state courts, and the court
should not have abstained under Younger principles.
Therefore, Younger equitable restraint is appropriate only when a
federal court is asked to enjoin state domestic relations proceedings, or
when federal review would effectively halt these proceedings. The peculiar modifiable nature of domestic relations decrees, however,
presents another factor to be considered in determining whether equitable restraint is appropriate.
The Supreme Court has stated that the Younger doctrine is not
ing custody of minor child); Williams v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(declaratory and injunctive relief denied because it would nullify decree of a Missouri court related to an area of domestic relations that has traditionally been province of states).
154. See Huynn Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 633 (6th Cir. 1978).
155. See Williams v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
156. 532 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
157. Id at 122.
158. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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applicable absent a pending state court proceeding. 159 A domestic relations action involving a modifiable decree, however, may constitute an
exception to this general rule. In Etlin v. Dalton' 60 a state court
awarded custody of a minor child to petitioner's ex-wife and ordered
the petitioner to pay child support. Petitioner then brought an action
for monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, alleging constitutional
violations arising from the custody and support award. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Younger equitable restraint applied, because under the state statute "custody determinations and support orders may be subject to modification at any
time," and therefore "custody proceedings are considered ongoing
16 1
proceedings."'
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Etlin, but Justices White
and Brennan dissented. Justice White protested that "the Court has
never applied the Younger doctrine to a case where the State was not a
party to the pending state proceedings,"' 62 and therefore the application of Younger to the case "represents a substantial broadening of the
doctrine."' 163 Justice White found unpersuasive the Fourth Circuit's
equation of a modifiable decree with an on-going or pending state
court proceeding. Because under this theory the custody proceedings
would never be final, Justice White found that the appellate court's
reasoning imposed an exhaustion requirement on the petitioner before
he could bring a section 1983 action, a result that the Court's Younger
doctrine decisions had not contemplated. Justice White recognized an
exception to the rule that section 1983 does not require exhaustion
when "standards of local law are woven into the case" whose resolution
should precede consideration by a federal court,' 64 but asserted that if
the case fell within the exception, the court should "refrain temporarily
from exercising its jurisdiction, but. . . should not dismiss the case." 165
Given the strong state interest in awarding or modifying a domestic relations decree, and the importance of local factors and institutions
in this decision, the Younger doctrine counsels equitable restraint when
a federal court plaintiff seeks what amounts to federal modification of a
decree modifiable under state law. Younger does not counsel restraint
where, as in Etlin, the petitioner asks only that the federal court enjoin
enforcement of a constitutionally infirm decree.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379 n.5 (1978).
673 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 3496 (1982).
Elin, 673 F.2d at 1309.
Etlin v. Robb, 102 S.Ct. 3496, 3497 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).

163. Id at 3498.
164. Id (quoting McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 673 (1963)).
165. Etlin v. Robb, 102 S. Ct. at 3498.
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CONCLUSION

Courts should apply abstention principles to domestic relations actions both for consistency in the law and for adequate protection of the
statutory grant of diversity jurisdition. Under Burford abstention, federal courts should abstain only if the case presents a state interest of
substantial concern and either an issue of unsettled state law or a comprehensive administrative and judicial mechanism with which federal
review would interfere. Younger equitable restraint is appropriate only
if the case requires enjoining state domestic relations proceedings, effectively halting state proceedings, or modifying a domestic relations
decree involving important local factors.
Rebecca E. Swenson

